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The Geographic Accessibility of Child Care Subsidies and 
Evidence on the Impact of Subsidy Receipt on Childhood Obesity
* 
 
This paper examines the impact of the spatial accessibility of public human services agencies 
on the likelihood of receiving a child care subsidy among disadvantaged mothers with young 
children. In particular, we collect data on the location of virtually every human services 
agency in the U.S. and use this information to calculate the approximate distance that 
families must travel from home in order to reach the nearest office that administers the 
subsidy application process. Using data from the Kindergarten cohort of the Early Childhood 
Longitudinal Study (ECLS-K), our results indicate that an increase in the distance to a public 
human services agency reduces the likelihood that a family receives a child care subsidy. 
Specifically, we estimate an elasticity of subsidy receipt with respect to distance of -0.13. The 
final section of the paper provides an empirical application in which we use variation in 
families’ travel distance to identify the causal effect of child care subsidies on children’s 
weight outcomes. Our instrumental variables estimates suggest that subsidized child care 
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I. Introduction 
 
Created alongside the passage of welfare reform in 1996, the Child Care and Development 
Fund (CCDF) is the primary funding stream devoted to child care assistance in the U.S.
2  Indeed, 
child care subsidies have been playing an increasingly important role in government efforts to reduce 
welfare caseloads and increase employment among  economically  disadvantaged families.    Yet 
despite these goals, the take -up rate for child care subsidies —defined as the fraction of eligible 
families receiving assistance—remains low.  For example, recent studies estimate that approximately 
15 to 30 percent of the eligible population is being served (Herbst, 2008; U.S. DHHS, 1999).  The 
low take-up rate is largely attributed to the CCDF’s funding structure as a close-ended block grant, 
but subsidy participation rates continue to be low in states that devote relatively more resources to 
child care assistance (U.S. DHHS, 2000) and among families that are explicitly targeted by state 
administrators (Schumacher & Greenberg, 1999).  This suggests that a combination of demand- and 
supply-side factors play an important role in influencing subsidy utilization.  
In this paper, we examine one such factor that has been largely ignored by previous research: 
the spatial accessibility of public human services agencies.  Proximity to a local agency can impact 
subsidy  receipt  during  multiple  stages  of  a  family’s  interaction  with  the  subsidy  system.    In 
particular, many parents are required to make one or more personal visits to an agency to conduct the 
initial in-take and eligibility screening (Adams, Synder, & Sandfort, 2002).  The number of office 
visits largely depends on state-specific rules governing the stringency of income and employment 
documentation  and  the  extent  to  which  families  require  assistance  locating  suitable  child  care 
providers.  In addition, parents in many jurisdictions are required to report in-person all changes to 
employment and income.  This can be particularly challenging for low-income parents, who have 
                                                       
2 In addition to the annual CCDF allocation, states may transfer up to 30 percent of their Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) grant 
to fund child care assistance through the CCDF.  These transfer funds are subject to most of the eligibility rules in the CCDF.  Another policy that 
provides child care assistance is the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit (CDCTC).  Created in 1976, the CDCTC initially provided a non-
refundable credit of $4,800 (2+ children) for child care expenses incurred.  Tax legislation in 2001 expanded the CDCTC by allowing families to 
claim additional child care expenses and increasing the credit rate for families below $43,000.  However, expenditures on the program remain 
modest (at $2.8 billion as of FY 2006), and it still operates as a non-refundable tax credit, making benefits largely inaccessible to low-income 
families (Burnam, Maag, & Rohaly, 2005).     3 
less access to automobile transportation and are more likely to experience frequent job turnover, 
seasonal or irregular work hours, and highly volatile earnings.  Finally, policies regarding eligibility 
recertification in some states require parents to make multiple trips to the local  human services 
agency.  In particular, the time-limited nature of child care subsidies—usually lasting three to 12 
months—implies that parents need to restart the eligibility process every few months or risk benefit 
termination.  Again, the ease with which families are able to complete the recertification process 
depends on the number and types of documents required and whether parents are able to schedule 
appointments with caseworkers at convenient times.  
At least two other factors interact with states’ subsidy policies that make spatial accessibility 
a particularly important consideration for low-income families.  First, it is plausible that families are 
more likely to apply for child care subsidies if they have sufficient information about the program’s 
operation and requirements.  Access to such knowledge is likely to be greater when the relevant 
agencies are located close to home.  Indeed, previous studies find that information and awareness are 
important determinants of participation in other programs, including food stamps (Daponte et al., 
1999) and Medicaid (Aizer, 2007).  Second, human services agencies located close to home may 
increase families’ trust in these institutions.  If potential subsidy recipients view local agencies as 
invested in the success of surrounding neighborhoods, such individuals could be more likely to apply 
for assistance.      
Low utilization rates have long been a source of concern for many means-tested programs, 
but  the  take-up  of  child  care  subsidies  is  substantially  lower  than  those  of  other  social  welfare 
programs  (Witte  &  Queralt,  2002).  For  example,  take-up  rates  range  from  43  percent  for  the 
Qualified Medicare Beneficiary program to 99 percent for Medicare Part A (Witte & Queralt, 2002). 
Take-up rates for other well-known programs are also relatively high: 40 percent for TANF (Crouse, 
Douglas, & Hauan, 2007), 60 percent for Food Stamps (Pavetti & Rosenbaum, 2010), and about 87 
percent for the school lunch program (Currie, 2003). As the recent economic downturn continues to   4 
leave millions of people unemployed, a record number of people are turning to the social safety net 
to ease their hardship. Furthermore, Congress in the next few years will reauthorize the Personal 
Responsibility  and  Work  Opportunity  Reconciliation  Act  (PRWORA),  the  1996  welfare  reform 
legislation that created the current child care subsidy system.   As a result, it is increasingly important 
to understand how means-tested programs can be redesigned to help low-income individuals access 
relevant benefits.  
Aside from its policy significance, an analysis of the geographic proximity of public human 
services agencies provides researchers with a unique opportunity to study the influence of child care 
subsidy policy on outcomes related to children and parents. To arrive at credible estimates of the 
impact of subsidy receipt, researchers must deal with a number of well-known selection problems 
(Berger & Black, 1992; Gelbach, 2002).  In particular, given that child care benefits are not randomly 
distributed to eligible families, those who utilize a subsidy may differ systematically from those who 
do not in ways that are not captured by researchers.  If these unobserved determinants of subsidy 
receipt are correlated with the outcome of interest, estimates of the impact of subsidy policy will be 
biased.  Unfortunately, finding exogenous sources of variation in subsidy receipt is difficult, and this 
has slowed progress in this important policy domain.
3       
Therefore, our measure of the  spatial accessibility of public human services is offered as a 
potentially useful way to leverage quasi-experimental variation in subsidy utilization.    In particular, 
it might be possible to identify the impact of subsidy receipt on a range of policy-relevant outcomes 
by exploiting geographic variation in families’ travel distance to the nearest agency.   Using the 
distance  measure  as  an  instrumental  variable  for  subsidy  receipt  is  equivalent  to  comparing  the 
outcomes of children and mothers who face different probabilities of subsidy receipt because they 
reside different distances to human services agencies.  As with all instruments, our proposed distance 
                                                       
3 These identification problems are frequently cited by child care scholars as one of the primary explanations for the diversity of estimates 
generated in the maternal employment literature (Anderson & Levine, 2004; Blau & Tekin, 2007; Blau, 2001; Tekin, 2007).   5 
measure must satisfy two conditions to serve as a valid  exclusion restriction, namely it must be 
highly correlated with child care subsidy receipt and it must be uncorrelated with the outcomes 
except through its impact on subsidy receipt.  We provide evidence throughout the paper that both 
conditions are likely to be met.      
To  demonstrate  the  usefulness  of  the  distance  measure  as  an  instrumental  variable,  we 
conduct an analysis of the impact of child care subsidies on childhood obesity.  The prevalence of 
childhood obesity has risen substantially over the last three decades and is now one of the most 
pressing public health concerns facing U.S. children.  In recent work, Herbst and Tekin (2011a) use 
data  from  the  Kindergarten  cohort  of  the  Early  Childhood  Longitudinal  Study  (ECLS-K)  to 
investigate the relationship between subsidy receipt in the year before kindergarten and children’s 
weight outcomes in the fall and spring of kindergarten.  The authors find that subsidized care is 
associated with increases in body mass index (BMI) and a greater likelihood of being overweight and 
obese.  Although the authors control for a large number of observable characteristics that are likely to 
be correlated with preferences for child care subsidies and children’s health, lingering concerns over 
the endogeneity of subsidy utilization do not permit a causal interpretation of the results.  In this 
paper, therefore, we revisit the analysis of children’s weight outcomes using the distance measure to 
produce credible estimates of the effect of child care subsidy receipt on childhood obesity.                     
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides a summary of the 
supply- and demand-side factors that explain parental decisions regarding subsidy utilization. Section 
III discusses the conceptual framework and empirical model for the relationship between parents’ 
travel distance and subsidy use.  In section IV, we introduce the survey data as well as describe the 
steps taken to create the distance measure.  Section V presents various estimates of the impact of 
proximity to these agencies on the likelihood of receiving subsidized child care.  In section VI, we 
use  the  distance  measure  to  instrument  for  subsidy  receipt  in  an  analysis  of  children’s  weight 
outcomes.  Finally, section VII offers conclusions and a discussion of policy implications.   6 
II. Background 
This  study  contributes  to  the  literature  on  the  analysis  of  demand-  and  supply-side 
determinants of child care subsidy receipt.   Studies of demand-side explanations usually find that 
young, unmarried women with greater numbers of young children are more likely to receive child 
care assistance.  Furthermore, subsidy recipients are simultaneously more likely to be employed and 
receive other means-tested benefits.  Interestingly, the likelihood of subsidy receipt is greater among 
families with relatively high levels of education, possibly because of the skills necessary to navigate 
the complex application process (Durfee & Meyers, 2006; Blau & Tekin, 2007; Herbst, 2008; Tekin 
2005; 2007). 
As for supply-side factors, low program awareness is frequently cited as being prohibitive, 
even though most states now conduct public awareness campaigns.  For example, one study finds 
that 44 percent of eligible non-applicants are unaware of their eligibility (Schlay et al., 2004).   High 
transaction  costs  also  appear  to  be  important  factors.    Recent  interviews  with  parents  and 
caseworkers in 12 states reveal administrative barriers to subsidy participation (Adams, Synder, & 
Sandfort, 2002).  In particular, the authors find that parents must communicate with a large number 
of administrative agencies to access and retain a subsidy.  The frequency of eligibility recertification 
and the requirement that caseworkers be notified of all changes to income and employment are also 
cited by families as being resource- and time-consuming.         
  A  sizeable  body  of  work  finds  that  measures  of  geographic  accessibility  are  strongly 
associated with work and welfare outcomes as well as participation in a variety of social services and 
means-tested programs. For example, Allard and Danziger (2003) find that job accessibility and 
proximity to employment opportunities increase the likelihood that low-income families find work 
and leave welfare.  Allard, Tolman, and Rosen (2003) show that greater spatial proximity to social 
service providers increases the probability that welfare recipients receive these services.  Neidell and 
Waldfogel  (2009)  analyze  the  impact  of  local  Head  Start  availability  on  immigrant  children’s   7 
participation.  The authors find that having a Head Start center in a child’s census tract significantly 
increases the likelihood of enrollment.  It has also been shown that the distance to medical care 
facilities is  positively  correlated  with  health  care  utilization  (e.g.,  Nemet and  Bailey,  2000)  and 
treatment intensity for acute myocardial infarction (McClellan et al., 1994).  Geographic variation in 
the proximity to college campuses during childhood appears to be highly correlated with later college 
attendance (Card, 1995).  Finally, Bertrand et al. (2000) show that social networks, as defined by 
proximity to services among those in the same language group, are an important determinant of 
welfare participation.   
There is considerable indirect evidence that decisions regarding child care subsidy receipt are 
likely to be sensitive to the geographic accessibility of agencies administering these programs.  For 
example, one study finds that mothers’ daily trip from home to the child care provider adds 28 
percent more time to the total commute (Michelson, 1985).  It is therefore not surprising that low-
income working mothers, in particular, stress the importance of locating child care services close to 
home or work (Henly & Lyons, 2000).  Another study finds that nearly 70 percent of low-income 
parents rate ―conveniently located services‖ as very important to their child decisions, compared to 
50 percent among high-income parents (U.S Department of Education, 1995).  These preferences 
appear to translate in practice: a study of child care subsidy recipients in Cuyahoga County, Ohio 
finds that such families travel approximately two miles to center-based providers and 1.5 miles to 
family daycare homes (Bania et al., 2000). 
III. Conceptual Framework and Empirical Model 
Economic models of program participation provide a structured approach to thinking about 
the impact of spatial accessibility on child care subsidy receipt (e.g., Moffitt, 1983).  In particular, 
parents are predicted to apply for and receive assistance when the benefits of doing so exceed the 
costs. In this framework, the distance to a local agency represents real costs in terms of travel time, 
transportation expenditures, and foregone earnings.  Therefore, parents in communities with less   8 
spatial accessibility to a public human services agency face higher costs and thus greater constraints 
on  subsidy  participation.    Many  of  these  costs  are  compounded  by  the  limitations  of  public 
transportation  in  high-poverty  neighborhoods  and  low  car  ownership  rates  among  low-income 
families (Allard, 2009; Berube & Raphael, 2005; Ong, 2002).  With single mothers’ commute times 
averaging 10 hours per week (Edin & Lein, 1997), greater distances to human services agencies 
make  it  increasingly  difficult  to  fulfill the  program  obligations  discussed above.    It  is  therefore 
expected that less spatial accessibility to a local agency reduces the likelihood of subsidy utilization. 
Formally, let a mother’s utility in the absence of a child care subsidy be expressed as U(Y; X, 
L),  where Y is private income, X represents demographic preference shifters, and L is a set of 
geographic characteristics that shape families’ decision-making.  If a mother receives a subsidy, her 
utility is expressed as U(Y + M; X, L) – D, where M captures the potential benefits of receiving child 
care assistance and D represents the disutility associated with program participation. The benefits of 
subsidy receipt include the increase in net-wages that results from decreased child care expenditures.   
The  disutility  of  subsidy  participation  is  related  to  the  time,  psychic,  and  transportation  costs 
associated with trips to public human services agencies.
4  It is further assumed that D is an increasing 
function of the distance between mothers’ residential location and the nearest agency.   
  A mother will therefore decide to receive a child care subsidy if U(Y + M; X, L) – U(Y; X, 
L) > D, that is, if the utility gain from receiving subsidized care exceeds the disutility.  Based on this 
simple model, the decision to utilize child care subsidies can be expressed by the following equation: 
(1)  Si = Xiβ1 + β2di+ Liβ3 + εi                 
where Si is an indicator of subsidy receipt for the i
th potentially eligible mother, Li is a set of local 
characteristics such as the availability of other services that are potential substitutes for child care 
                                                       
4 Another potential benefit of receiving a child care subsidy could be improved child well-being if it is used to purchase a high-quality child care 
arrangement. This would be formalized by including child quality as another argument in the mother’s utility function.  However, this is not 
necessary for the purposes of this paper.  Another potential cost of receiving a child care subsidy could be stigma.  However, we do not explicitly 
focus  on  stigma  since  it  is  largely  unobserved  and difficult  to  separate  from  transaction  costs and  information  (Moffitt,  1983;  Neidell  & 
Waldfogel, 2009).  In addition, the literature suggests that other costs associated with the take-up of social programs are more important than 
stigma (Currie, 2004).   9 
subsidies (e.g., church services, Head Start, etc.); X is a set of child and family characteristics that 
could influence the decision to take-up a child care subsidy, and εi is an idiosyncratic error term.  The 
di is the measure of spatial accessibility, defined as the  approximate distance (in miles) between 
families’  residential  location  and  the  nearest  public  human  services  agency.    We  create  two 
parameterizations of the travel distance.  First, we incorporate the natural logarithm of the distance to 
allow for a linear relationship.  We then test a non-parametric version of the distance measure by 
including dummy variables for the quartiles of the distance distribution. In results available upon 
request, we also experiment with quadratic and higher-order polynomials in the distance measure.  
However, in each case only the linear term is statistically significant.  The coefficient of interest is β2, 
which captures the impact of distance on the probability of receiving a subsidy.  Our main testable 
hypothesis is that the probability of subsidy receipt decreases with the distance to the nearest social 
welfare agency (i.e., β2=δS/δd < 0).  We estimate versions of (1) using a linear probability model 
(LPM).
5       
A potential concern with this estimation strategy is that our distance measure could be 
determined in part by the joint location  preferences of families and  human services agencies. For 
example, administrative offices might locate in low-income neighborhoods in order to be accessible 
to potentially eligible clients.  In addition, given the low rates of car ownership among disadvantaged 
families, such individuals may prefer to re side near critical support services  or employment and 
public  transportation  centers .    If  these  unobserved  neighborhood  characteristics  determine  the 
relative location of families and agencies, the coefficient on the distance measure will be biased.
6  
                                                       
5 The least squares estimates of coefficients in LPMs are consistent estimates of average probability derivatives, but the standard errors are biased 
as a result of heteroskedasticity. We report standard errors that are robust to any form of heteroskedasticity.  Since our distance measure is based, 
in part, on families’ residential census tract, the standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the census tract-level.  Our results are robust to 
clustering at the county-level.  We also estimate (1) using probit and logit regression.  Marginal effects from these models are very similar to 
those from the LPM.     
6 It is important to note that in some states the same human services agency provides access to multiple benefits (eg., cash assistance and child 
care subsidies).  If some areas are more likely to operate in this manner than other areas (eg., rural versus urban areas), it could be the case that 
endogenous location choices for families and agencies are stronger (or at least operate differently) across these areas.  However, we have not been 
able to uncover any evidence that the choice of service provision is correlated with states’ urbanicity.       10 
Recent empirical work finds little support for the notion that individuals Tiebout sort across 
space  in  order  to  access  government-provided  goods  and  services  (Rhode  &  Strumpf,  2003).  
Furthermore, while endogenous location choices are plausible for entitlement programs or services 
with open-ended funding streams, we argue that it is highly unlikely that low-income parents move 
to a given neighborhood to be close to an agency administering child care subsidies.  These benefits 
are heavily rationed by local agencies (because of the close-ended block grant funding structure), 
suggesting that the supply of subsidies is outstripped by demand.  As a result, it is common for 
parents  to  experience  frozen  intake  and  long  waiting  lists  (Herbst,  2008).    Children  receiving 
subsidized care do so for only short periods before restarting the eligibility process, and all interim 
income and employment changes must be reported to caseworkers.  Therefore, it seems fairly risky to 
choose a residential location based on the location of child care administrators. As pointed out by 
Allard (2009), the location choices of social service agencies are constrained in a number of ways.  
These constraints help to explain why one-fifth of the social service agencies in his three-city study 
had been operating in the same location for six to 10 years, and over half were in the same location 
for more than 10 years.  As a result, social service agencies are unlikely to adjust rapidly to changes 
in the geographic distribution of low-income families.   
Nevertheless, we take a number of steps in the empirical analysis to mitigate the influence of 
endogenous location choices.  Our preferred specification adds county fixed effects, which capture 
unobserved local determinants of the demand for child care subsidies that may bias the coefficient on 
di.  In addition to removing the influence of county- and state-level demographic and economic 
characteristics, county fixed effects control for the availability of substitute forms of early care and 
education (Li), which may affect the demand for a child care subsidy.   The fixed effects also account 
for unobserved CCDF policies that are correlated with the spatial location and availability of human 
services agencies.  For example, some jurisdictions allow families to apply for assistance via mail,   11 
telephone, or the web.
7   It is also plausible that some counties conduct outreach campaigns to raise 
awareness of subsidy programs as well as provide  parents with support services to access local 
agencies.                
In robustness checks, we add detailed controls for the neighborhood environment (i.e., census 
tract) in which families and agencies are located .  In addition, separate models experiment with a 
vector of school fixed effects.  Together, the census tract c ontrols and school fixed effects could be 
more  effective  than  the  county  fixed  effects  at  controlling  for  factors  in  the   neighborhood 
environment that lead families and agencies to systematically sort in space .  As a final robustness 
check, we take advantage of two questions in the ECLS -K that permit more explicit controls for 
endogenous location choices.  The first question asks parents whether (and how times) the family 
moved since the birth of the focal child.   The second question inquires about  whether the home 
location was chosen because  of local school characteristics.  N early two-thirds of families in our 
sample moved at least once  since childbirth, and  one-quarter of parents chose the current home 
location  because  of  local  school  characteristics.    Therefore,  these  are  potentially  important 
preference-shifters that could be correlated with  the travel distance and subsidy receipt.
8  In each 
robustness check, the coefficient on travel distance is not noticeably differe nt from that of our 
preferred specification using county fixed effects.   
 IV. Data 
Our data come from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study–Kindergarten cohort (ECLS-
K).  The ECLS-K is a nationally representative sample of 21,260 children attending kindergarten in 
                                                       
7 As of 1998, 14 states in our ECLS-K sample allowed families to request subsidy applications mail, telephone, or email (Alaska, Arizona, 
Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington).  Another 
five states (Maine, Michigan, Oregon, Texas, and Washington) allowed families to complete the subsidy application via mail or telephone.    
8 The fraction of movers is consistent across the distance distribution.  However, we find some evi dence that the home location variable is 
correlated with travel distance.  Fully 23 percent of parents at the first quartile of the distance distribution responded th at they chose the home 
location because of school characteristics, increasing to 30 percen t among parents at the fourth quartile of the distribution.  These differences, 
which are statistically significant, largely disappear when basic controls for the neighborhood environment are introduced.   The rate of subsidy 
receipt is higher among movers (8.5 percent compared to four percent) and lower among families choosing the home location because school of 
characteristics (5.8 percent compared to 7.5 percent).        12 
the fall of 1998.
9 Children in the ECLS-K are followed through the eighth grade, with detailed parent 
interviews and child assessments conducted in the fall and spring of kindergarten (1998 and 1999) 
and the spring of first (2000), third (2002),  fifth (2004), and eighth (2007) grade.  The analyses in 
this study are based on the fall of kindergarten wave of data  collection, in which parents are asked 
about child care experiences, including subsidy participation, in the year prior to kindergarten entry. 
  Our analysis sample includes families potentially eligible for child care subsidies.      To be 
eligible for CCDF funds, families must have at least one child ages 0 to 13; parents are required to 
participate in a state-defined acceptable work activity; and total income must fall below 85 percent of 
the state median income.   In practice, however, the extraordinary amount of state variation in 
eligibility rules creates difficulties for precisely simulating eligibility (Giannarelli et al., 2001; Witte 
& Queralt, 2003).  Therefore, we define the  analysis sample to include families in the bottom three 
quintiles of the full sample socioeconomic status (SES) distribution .
10   Our final analysis sample 
includes 9,231 children.
11          
An implication of limiting the sample to potentially eligible families is that the subsidy 
participation rate is likely to be an underestimate of the take -up rate.  Indeed, approximately seven 
percent of families in our sample receive a child care subsidy, whereas studies that carefully simulate 
eligibility find participation rates between 15 percent and 30 percent (e.g., Herbst, 2008). It is 
important to note that we experiment with several alternative sample selection criteria, including 
explicit attempts to define a low -skilled sample (e.g, mothers  with less than a B.A degree),   an 
income- and employment-based eligible sample (e.g., families below 85 percent of a state’s median 
income and working mothers), and those whose demographic characteristics are highly correlated 
with subsidy receipt (e.g., unmarried mothers).  In no case do these alternatives materially change the 
                                                       
9 For more information on the ECLS-K, see Herbst and Tekin (2010a, 2011). 
10 Created by ECLS-K administrators, the SES index is based on parental education and occupation and total family income. 
11 To create the analysis sample, we dropped additional observations if there was missing information on the census tract identi fication number 
(2,256 observations), missing information on the entire parent interview (740 observations), missing information on the child care subsidy receipt 
question (35 observations), and mothers with nonsensical ages (6 observations).        13 
results discussed below.
12                     
  The  outcome  variable in our analysi s is a bi nary indicator for  whether a child received 
subsidized, non-parental child care in the year prior to kindergarten.  Parents are asked a series of 
questions about child care use during the previous year, including the number of arrangements, the 
amount of time that each arrangement was used, whether there was a cost associated with each 
arrangement, and if so, the amount paid for care.  Regarding subsidy receipt, parents were asked the 
following: ―Did any of the following people or organizations help to pay for this … provider to care 
for  {CHILD}  the  year  before  {he/she}  started  kindergarten?‖    Four  possible  choices  were  then 
presented to parents, and we coded those answering ―a social service agency or welfare office‖ as 
receiving a child care subsidy.
13 
The primary right-hand-side variable is a measure of the spatial accessibility of local  public 
human services agencies, defined as the distance (in miles) that families must travel from home  in 
order  to reach  the  nearest office that administers the subsidy app lication process.   Appendix A 
provides a detailed description of the steps taken to generate the distance measure, so we include 
only a brief discussion here.
14  The process began by creating a database containing the precise 
location (building number, street name, city, state, and zip code) of every  public human services 
agency in the U.S. In doing so, we were careful to ensure that a given agency is involved in 
eligibility and benefit determination for  CCDF child care subsidies. Our database contains location 
information  on  over  3,600  human  services  agencies.
15  The  next  step  in  the  process  involved 
                                                       
12 The estimated effect of families’ travel distance on subsidy utilization in column (4) of Table 1 (the full model) is -0.009**.  When the sample 
definition is changed to low-skilled mothers, the coefficient on travel distance is -0.007**.  Similarly, when the sample includes eligible families, 
as defined by the CCDF rules (i.e., family income is less than 85 percent of a state’s median income or the mother is employed), the coefficient 
on travel distance is -0.006**.  Thus, our results are robust to changes in the sample definition.   
13 As described in the conceptual framework, this variable allows us to model the parental decision to apply for and receive a c hild care subsidy.  
We do not model decisions regarding child care arrangements, although subsidy r eceipt has been shown to be associated with a shift to formal 
child care settings (Tekin, 2005; 2007). For example, in our analysis sample, 25 percent of unsubsidized children are in parent care, while no 
subsidized children receive this care.  A little over seven percent of unsubsidized children enroll in center-based services, compared to 38 percent 
among their subsidized counterparts. Therefore, it is conceivable that our results on travel distance and subsidy receipt may indirectly apply to the 
relationship between travel distance and the choice of child care provider.  For example, given the negative relationship between tra vel distance 
and subsidy receipt documented in this paper and the positive correlation between  subsidy receipt and formal child care enrollment found by 
previous studies (Tekin, 2005; 2007), it is possible that increases in travel distance reduce probability of attending formal child care.  
14 The forthcoming discussion and Appendix A are drawn from Herbst and Tekin (2010b; 2011b).  
15 The public human services agency database will be made available to researchers upon request.     14 
geocoding the location of administrative offices by assigning a latitude and longitude coordinate to 
each. In an overwhelming number of cases (95 percent), we were able to assign a geocode based on 
either the agency’s exact location or its census block.  Only five percent of offices were geocoded at 
the city- or zip code-level.
16 In the final step, we calculated the Euclidean (or as -the-crow-flies) 
distance between the location of human services agencies and the centroid (or geographic center) of 
the census tract in which ECLS-K  families reside.  We generate the distance measure based on 
families’ census tract because residential addresses are not available in the ECLS-K.  In addition, 
given that states’ child care subsidy programs are administered primarily at the county-level, we use 
families’ county of residence as the geographic boundary for calculating the distances. 
A potential concern with using the census tract centroid to create the travel distance is that it 
introduces a form of aggregation error (Hewko et al., 2002).  This type of measurement error plagues 
spatial accessibility indicators that are aggregated to a geographic unit of analysis (in this case, the 
census tract) that varies substantially in size.  Given that the land area associated with residential 
census  tracts  differs  dramatically  across  ECLS-K  children,  a  distance  measure  based  on  the 
geographic  center  of  census  tracts  introduces  non-random  measurement  error  into  the  distance 
calculations.
17  In particular, the amount of error has been shown to increase with the size of the 
geographic unit (Apparicio et al., 2003 ; Apparicio et al., 2008;  Pone et al., 2006).  Large census 
tracts are more common in suburban and rural areas, suggesting that our distance measure could be 
less precise for families in these neighborhoods.
18  We attempt to deal with aggregation error in 
several ways.  In the robustness analyses, we begin by controlling for census tract population density, 
which depends in part on its land area  (defined as square miles).  We then  estimate models that 
control explicitly for land area.  Finally, we estimate two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions that 
                                                       
16 Our results are robust to the exclusion of these agencies from the calculation of the travel distance. 
17 The median child in our analysis sample resides in a census tract that is 1.5 square miles.  There is, however, considerable  variation in the 
census tract land area.  For example, the range is 0.02 square miles to 6,521 square miles, and the standard deviation is approximately 139 square 
miles.    
18 The median child in an urban area lives in a census tract that is 1.1 square miles.  The comparable figure for  children in rural areas is 35.4 
square miles.      15 
alternately use the average county- and zip code-level travel distance as an instrument for families’ 
travel distance.  Our main results are robust to these specification checks.                           
Following the literature on the determinants of child care subsidy receipt, we include in the 
model a detailed vector of controls for child and family characteristics.  The child variables include 
gender, age, race/ethnicity, contemporaneous weight, premature birth, low birth weight, disability 
status, and first-time kindergartner.   The set of  family  characteristics includes maternal  age and 
educational attainment, family structure, number of other children in the household, whether English 
is the spoken language at home, and the log of household income.  We also incorporate binary 
indicators to control for missing observations on each of our control variables. 
V. Results 
  Results from equation (1) are shown in Table 1. The top panel presents results from models 
that use the natural logarithm of the distance to the closest agency.
19  By employing the natural 
logarithm, we mitigate the influence of outliers in determining regression coefficients. In addition, 
we allow for non-linearities in the relationship between the distance measure and subsidy receipt by  
including binary indicators for the second, third, and  fourth quartiles  of the distance distribution 
(binary indicator for the first quartile is the omitted category).  These r esults are presented in the 
bottom panel.  In column (1), we display the basic results from models that only include the distance 
variable.  In columns (2) and (3), we add child characteristics and family characteristics, respectively.  
In column (4), we incorporate county fixed effects.         
As shown in the top panel of Table 1, the coefficient on the distance measure is negative and 
statistically significant in all models, indicating that an increase in the distance to the nearest  public 
human services  agency reduces the likelihood that a family receives a child care subsidy.  The 
coefficient in column (4)  implies that a one-percent increase in the mileage to the nearest agency 
                                                       
19 Note that there are multiple agencies to choose from in some counties.  In those cases, the distance measure represents the distance to the 
closest agency.   16 
decreases the probability of subsidy utilization by 0.9 percentage points.  This estimate yields an 
elasticity of child care subsidy receipt with respect to distance of -0.13.   
The results in the bottom panel of Table 1 suggest that the probability of subsidy receipt 
decreases monotonically as families reside greater distances from the closest public human services 
agency.  Families located in the third and fourth quartiles of the distance distribution are 2.2 and 2.6 
percentage points less likely to receive a subsidy than those in the first quartile, respectively.  Those 
in the second quartile are about one percentage point less likely to receive a subsidy than those in the 
first quartile, although the coefficient is not precisely estimated.   
  Table 2 presents results from a number of robustness checks and sub-group analyses.  In 
terms  of  robustness  checks,  we  add  several  controls  to  further  account  for  the  possibility  of 
endogenous location choices among parents and human services agencies.  First, we incorporate a 
rich set of controls for the census tract in which ECLS-K families and agencies reside.
20  Second, we 
remove the county fixed effects and  add school fixed effects, which serves as another  proxy for 
neighborhood characteristics that  may capture unobserved location preferences.  If anything, these 
additional  location controls have   the effect of making   the distance coefficient more negative, 
suggesting that unobserved location preferences cause the OLS estimates to understate the true effect 
of families’ travel distance.
21 
  Finally, we attempt to more explicitly control for parental location preferences by adding 
binary indicators for whether the family   moved since the focal child’s birth and whether the parents 
chose the home location because of school characteristics.  To the extent that school characteristics 
are correlated with the availability and attributes of local social services, controlling for this variable 
                                                       
20 The family census tract controls are population density, percent females ages 16+ employed, percent ages 0-17, percent ages 65+, percent 
employed in local government, percent employed in state government, percent ages 25+ with less than a high school degree, and percent foreign 
born.  The agency census tract controls are log of median household income, log of population density, percent non-Hispanic white, percent 
foreign born, percent ages 65 and over, percent female, percent of households receiving welfare, and percent of employed females ages 16 and 
over.  The model including the agency controls omits the county fixed effects but includes school fixed effects.  We do this because, due to data 
exigencies, the agency characteristics are aggregated up to the county-level.  We also estimate a model that includes the family and social service 
agency characteristics simultaneously (along with school fixed effects).  Results are robust to this specification.     
21 This makes sense: if agencies indeed choose to reside near potential clients, the distance should be positively correlated with factors associated 
with socioeconomic status.  This implies that a regression model that fails to take these factors into account would result in estimates that are 
biased toward zero.   17 
may further mitigate the potential bias associated with endogenous location choices.  As shown in 
Table 2, our results are robust to the inclusion of these controls. 
In results available upon request, we implement a falsification test to gain more confidence 
that we account for unobserved heterogeneity. Specifically, we estimate our most comprehensive 
model replacing the outcome of subsidy receipt with a binary indicator for whether a parent has 
obtained a bachelor’s degree or more.
22 The idea is that the distance to the nearest public human 
services agency should not predict an outcome that is unlikely to be influenced by child care subsidy 
receipt.  As  expected,  we  find  that  the  distance  to  the  nearest  agency  is  uncorrelated  with  the 
educational attainment of low-skilled mothers.  In particular, the impact of the natural logarithm of 
the distance measure on the likelihood that a mother has at least a college education is statistically 
and economically insignificant, with a coefficient of 0.0014 and a p-value of 0.52. 
  The next set of robustness checks attempt to account for measurement error in the travel 
distance that arises from using the geographic center of census tracts of different sizes to construct 
the distance measure.  Our first strategy is to control explicitly for the land area of each census tract.  
As previously stated, the vector of census tract controls described above includes population density, 
defined as a ratio of each neighborhood’s total population to its land area.  Inclusion of this (and the 
other) neighborhood controls do not alter the main results.  We also enter land area and land area 
squared directly into the model, and find that these controls do not influence the coefficient on the 
distance measure.  Interestingly, neither of the land area variables is statistically significant.  Our 
second strategy instruments for families’ travel distance using average distance measures aggregated 
to both the county- and zip code-levels.  The first-stage F-statistic on the aggregated county and zip 
code distance is, respectively, 78.8 and 233.6, indicating a strong correlation between families’ travel 
distance and the aggregated distance instruments.  As shown in Table 2, the second-stage results 
                                                       
22 However, we implement this exercise excluding from the analysis the sub-set of parents who are currently attending school.  This exclusion is 
necessary because subsidy receipt can induce parents to engage in work or work-related activities, such as attending school.  Therefore, distance 
measure may indirectly affect the current schooling by affecting the decision to receive a subsidy.     18 
continue to show a negative and statistically significant relationship between families’ travel distance 
and subsidy utilization.  In addition, the instrumental variables estimates are fairly close in magnitude 
to the OLS results, suggesting that the county fixed effects and neighborhood controls mitigate the 
influence of systematic measurement error in the distance measure.                            
  In the final set of robustness checks, we test alternative distance measures.  Recall that the 
results  presented  so  far  are  based  on  the  distance  to  the  closest  public  human  services  agency.  
Approximately one-third of families in our dataset live in jurisdictions that contain multiple agencies 
administering  CCDF  subsidies.    To  account  for  the  presence  of  multiple  agencies,  we  create  a 
distance variable based on the sum of the inverse distances, which is advantageous because it gives 
more weight to agencies that are closer to families’ residential location.  The coefficient suggests that 
a one-percent increase in the mileage to the local administrative office reduces the likelihood of 
subsidy receipt by 1.1 percentage points         
  The remaining results in Table 2 explore the possibility of heterogenous effects of families’ 
travel distance.  In particular, when we estimate the models separately for families residing in urban 
and non-urban areas, the impact of distance is substantially larger among those in non-urban areas.
23  
This finding is plausible given that access to public transportation and major roadways is likely to be 
more restricted in non-urban areas.  Furthermore, human services agencies are distributed over larger 
land areas in rural counties , resulting  in longer  travel distances for  families residing in these 
jurisdictions.
24                     
Next, we estimate models separately for states that do and do not allow families to request or 
complete subsidy applications through the mail, telephone, or web.   It is important to reiterate that 
although some parents may not be required to visit an office for the initial application and eligibility 
screening, there  are numerous factors subsequent to this that may necessitate in -person visits 
                                                       
23 We define urban as residence in a census-defined city (of any size) or another census-designated urban area.  
24 Indeed, the average distance to the closest agency in urban areas is 6.52 miles, compared to 12.37 miles in non-urban areas.   19 
(Adams, Synder, & Sandfort, 2002).  Therefore, it is plausible that distance continues to be costly for 
families that are allowed to submit subsidy applications through alternative means.   Our results 
appear  to  corroborate  this  intuition:  increases  in  the  distance  measure  are  associated  with  a 
statistically  significant  reduction  in  subsidy  receipt  irrespective  of  whether  families  must  make 
personal visits to the local public human services agency.           
We also examine the extent to which access to reliable transportation differentially influences 
the role of distance in determining subsidy participation.  It is possible, for example, that the impact 
of distance is substantially greater among families facing high transportation costs because of low car 
ownership rates.  In other words, if the distance to an agency influences subsidy participation by 
altering transportation costs, we might expect lower subsidy participation rates among families with 
low car ownership rates.  To test this, we merge the ECLS-K data with household car ownership rates 
calculated at the census-tract-level, and use this information to divide neighborhoods into ―high‖ and 
―low‖ car ownership neighborhoods.
25  We then estimate the full model separately for families in 
each of these neighborhood -types.   Consistent with our expectation, the distance measure has a 
greater impact on subsidy participation among families with higher transportation costs (residing  in 
―low‖ car ownership neighborhoods) than those with lower transportation costs (residing in ―high‖ 
car ownership neighborhoods).   
Finally,  we  estimate  models  separately  by  families’  cash  assistance  status  (receipt  of 
AFDC/TANF or food stamps).   Interestingly, the results indicate that distance serves as an obstacle 
to subsidy receipt only for those families not receiving other forms of cash assistance.  To the extent 
that families receiving welfare and food stamps have already committed to traveling to agencies, 
                                                       
25 These data are drawn from the 2000 Decennial Census.  Neighborhoods coded as having ―high‖ car ownership rates are those in which the 
fraction of households owning zero cars is at or below the 25
th percentile of the distribution or those in which the fraction of households owning 
two or more cars is at or above 75
th percentile of the distribution.  All other neighborhoods are coded as ―low‖ car ownership neighborhoods.   20 
distance should be less influential in the decision to apply for and receive other forms of assistance, 
including child care subsidies.
26,27 
To put  our results into perspective, a number of simulations are conducted in which we 




th percentiles of the full sample distance distribution.  The mileage at these percentiles 
corresponds to travel distances of 1.9, 1.2, and 0.9 miles, respectively.  These predicted probabilities 
are also compared to a ―baseline‖ prediction that uses the sample mean of the distance measure (7.7 
miles) to calculate the utilization rate.  The simulations are conducted for all families, and separately 
for families living in urban and non-urban areas.  As shown in the top panel of Table 3, reducing 
families’ travel distance from the mean to the 5
th percentile of the distance distribution increases the 
predicted subsidy utilization rate from seven percent to 8.5 percent.  This represents a 21 percent 
increase in the predicted utilization rate.  Not surprisingly, reductions in the travel distance lead to 
substantially greater increases in subsidy receipt among non-urban families than urban families, as 
shown  the  second  and  third  panels.    For  example,  the  anticipated  effect  of  reducing  the  travel 
distance to the 5
th percentile among urban families is to increase the participation rate from seven 
percent to eight percent, an increase of 14 percent.  The identical reduction in the travel distance for 
non-urban  families  increases  the  predicted  subsidy  participation  rate  from  seven  percent  to  12 
percent, an increase of nearly 76 percent.  Therefore, one of the key policy implications of our results 
is  that the  subsidy  take-up  rate  could  be  increased  by  relocating  agencies  closer  to low-income 
neighborhoods, particularly in rural areas, where travel distances tend to be substantially longer and 
families are more sensitive to the costs of establishing and maintaining subsidy eligibility.   
                                                       
26 It is plausible that several of the variables used to create the sub-groups actually belong in the main subsidy utilization model.  For example, the 
indicators for urban residence, AFDC/TANF/food stamp receipt, and census tract car ownership rates could be important determinants of subsidy 
utilization. We therefore test the robustness of the main results with these variables added, and find that their inclusion does not substantially 
change the estimated effect of families’ travel distance on subsidy receipt.  The coefficient (and standard error) on the log of distance to social 
service agencies is -0.007* (0.004) with these variables included.             
27 In results available upon request, we estimate the model separately for white non-Hispanic families and all other racial and ethnic groups.  Both 
sets of families respond similarly to an  increase in the distance to human  social services agencies.  However, the estimates are less precisely 
estimated due to smaller sample sizes.     21 
To provide additional context for potential policy implications, we estimate the full model 
separately for families residing in counties with a single public human services agency and those 
with  access  to  multiple  agencies.    Our  results  suggest  that  families’  travel  distance  is  strongly 
associated with subsidy utilization among parents with access to just a single agency, but much less 
strongly associated with subsidy receipt among parents who may chose between multiple agencies.  
In particular, a one  percent increase in  travel distance is associated with a  1.3 percentage point 
decrease in the subsidy participation rate among parents living in counties with a single agency.  The 
corresponding figure for parents living in counties with multiple agencies is 0.05 percentage points.  
Unlike the policy simulations above, which decreased the average travel distance for select families 
(while holding constant the number of accessible agencies), this analysis provides initial evidence 
that increasing the number of administrative offices may similarly increase the subsidy utilization 
rate.   
 VI. Empirical Application: Child Care Subsides and Children’s Weight Outcomes 
Introduction and Discussion of the Conceptual Framework 
A potential benefit of our agency database is that it presents a unique opportunity to study the 
impact of child care subsidies on outcomes related to children and parents. One such possibility is an 
analysis of the relationship between subsidy receipt and low-income children’s weight outcomes.  As 
mentioned earlier, childhood obesity is one of the most pressing public health problems in the United 
States. Over the past three decades, the prevalence of childhood obesity increased from five percent 
to 10.4 percent among two- to five-year-olds and from 6.5 percent to 19.6 percent among six- to 
eleven-year-olds (Ogden, et al., 2008; Ogden et al., 2010). Severe weight problems during childhood 
are  associated  with  a  variety  of  short-  and  long-term  consequences,  ranging  from  childhood 
depression  and  poorer  academic  achievement  to  lower  wages  and  continued  health  problems 
throughout adulthood (Mocan & Tekin, 2010; Strauss, 2000; Daniels, Arnett, & Eckel, 2005; Dietz, 
1998).   22 
  Concurrent  with  the  rise  in  childhood  obesity  rates  has  been  a  dramatic  increase  in  the 
fraction of preschool-age children enrolled in child care arrangements.  For example, participation 
rates in center-based care among three-year-olds increased from eight percent in 1968 to 39 percent 
in 2000, while the enrollment of four-year-olds increased from 23 percent to 65 percent over the 
same period (Bainbridge et al., 2005).  Currently, approximately two-thirds of preschool-age children 
overall regularly attend some form of child care, and many of these children receive intense exposure 
to  these  arrangements  (U.S.  Census  Bureau,  2010).    Young  children  of  employed  mothers,  for 
example, spend an average of 33 hours per week in center-based care and 30 hours per week in 
family-based  settings (calculated among those enrolled in a given setting) (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2010).  Given that previous studies find a relationship between both non-parental child care and 
increased  childhood  obesity  (e.g.,  Hubbard,  2008)  and  child  care  subsidy  receipt  and  increased 
participation in non-parental child care (e.g., Tekin 2005), it is important to study directly the impact 
of current child care subsidy policy on children’s weight outcomes.    
As described in Herbst and Tekin (2011a), child care subsidies can influence low-income 
children’s weight outcomes through a number of mechanisms.  First, subsidies reduce the amount of 
time children spend in parent and relative care while increasing participation in center- and family-
based  arrangements.    To  the  extent  that  the  nutrition  and  physical  activity  patterns  in  these 
environments differ, this transition may have implications for children’s weight outcomes.  Non-
parental child care more generally is critical in laying the foundation for children’s food consumption 
and exercise patterns. Structural and process features of the child care environment can dictate the 
types of physical activities in which children are engaged (e.g., structured or free-play), the number 
of hours per day in which children are performing these activities, and whether these activities occur 
primarily  in  indoor  or  outdoor  spaces.  In  addition,  menu  options  in  child  care  settings  expose 
children to a variety of new foods and flavors, which can influence food preferences at home and   23 
school (Deckelbaum & Williams 2001). Child care providers can also serve as a powerful bridge to 
aid parents in making healthy food choices in other contexts (Story et al. 2006).   
Second, child care subsidies administered through the CCDF require parents to be employed 
or engaged in a work-related activity in order to qualify for assistance.  A large number of studies 
find that maternal employment by itself is associated with increases in childhood obesity (Anderson 
et al., 2003; Ruhm, 2008; Classen & Hokayem, 2005; Phipps et al., 2006; Courtemanche, 2007; 
Cawley & Liu, 2007).  Subsequent work by Fertig et al. (2009) posits that employed mothers have 
less time available to prepare healthy meals at home, and may opt instead for more pre-packaged 
food, take-out or home-delivered meals, and eating out at restaurants, all of which lead to a greater 
consumption of calories and fat than the typical home-prepared meal.  Moreover, working mothers 
are thought to have less time available to shape and participate in their children’s eating and physical 
activity habits. Such increased autonomy may mean that children on their own choose sub-optimal 
eating and activity patterns or spend more time with others who make poor health decisions on their 
behalf.    
Finally, subsidies lower out-of-pocket expenses associated with child care, thereby increasing 
disposable income, which, in principle, can be spent on goods and services that influence children’s 
weight outcomes both positively and negatively.  In particular, it is unclear whether families would 
spend the additional income on goods that enhance child quality (e.g., home production of meals) or 
whether  these  resources  increase  the  demand  for  fast  food  and  sedentary  activities  (e.g.,  video 
games).   
Herbst and Tekin (2011a) constitute the first attempt to shed light on the relationship between 
child care subsidies and children’s weight outcomes.  Using data from the ECLS-K, they find that 
subsidy receipt in the year before kindergarten entry is associated with a 1.7 percent increase in BMI, 
a 5.2 percentage point increase in the probability of being classified overweight, and a 3.1 percentage 
point increase in the probability of being classified obese in the fall of kindergarten.  The authors’   24 
identification strategy relies primarily on controlling for a large number of observable child and 
family characteristics and incorporating county fixed effects to account for unmeasured familial and 
environmental factors correlated with subsidy receipt and children’s weight.   Unfortunately, this 
approach does not convincingly mitigate the influence of confounding variables. Therefore, results in 
Herbst and Tekin (2011a) cannot necessarily be interpreted as causal. 
Empirical Implementation 
In this section, we revisit the analysis in Herbst and Tekin (2011a) by using the distance 
measure described earlier to generate plausibly exogenous variation in child care subsidy receipt.  In 
particular,  we  use  families’  travel  distance  to  the  nearest  public  human  services  agency  as  an 
instrumental variable to identify the causal effect of subsidy receipt on children’s weight outcomes.  
As with our previous work (Herbst & Tekin, 2011a; 2011b; 2010a; 2010b), the current analysis of 
childhood obesity is based on an ECLS-K sample of children living with an unmarried mother as of 
the fall of kindergarten interview.
28  We limit the sample to  single mothers because they are the 
central focus of recent social policy reforms, including the PRWORA, which was intended to move 
low-skilled women from welfare to work . In addition, constraining the sample to single mothers 
allows us to focus on potentially eligible  families without having to rely on exclusions based on 
endogenous family characteristics  (e.g., welfare receipt). Indeed, unmarried mothers constitute 64 
percent of eligible subsidy recipients  (Herbst, 2008).
29  Our  final  analysis sample includes 3, 742 
children in the fall of kindergarten and 3,577 in the spring of kindergarten.         
  We are concerned with three measures of children’s weight throughout kindergarten: BMI 
                                                       
28 See Herbst and Tekin (2010a) for a detailed discussion of the sample creation.  To be included in the sample, children must reside with a 
biological mother only, a biological mother and a partner ―father,‖ an unmarried adoptive mother who may or may not be living with a partner 
―father,‖ or an unrelated, unmarried guardian who may or may not be living with a partner ―father.‖  Exclusions from the sample are made if the 
child is missing information on all outcome variables (1,766) or the entire fall of kindergarten parent interview (740), the questions regarding 
child care subsidy receipt (35), and census tract identifiers (2,256).  We exclude an additional 12,607 children who do not meet our requirements 
for residence with an unmarried mother. 
29 Note that this sample definition differs from the one used in the analysis of the impact of travel distance on subsidy utilization (i.e., bottom 
three quintiles of the SES distribution).  To elaborate on the discussion in the text, we change the sample to single mothers for two reasons.  First, 
we want to be consistent with Herbst and Tekin (2011).  Second, SES depends in part on family income, which could introduce a form of sample 
selection bias.  In particular, if family income determines which families use child care subsidies and it affects  children’s weight outcomes, we 
are concerned that conditioning the sample on income could bias the estimated effect of subsidy receipt.  Nevertheless, we test the robustness of 
our main weight results by examining two alternative sample definitions: low-education mothers and families below 85 percent of the state 
median income.  Results from these models are similar to those presented here.                   25 
and binary indicators of overweight and obesity status.  The measure of BMI is calculated as weight 
in kilograms divided by height in meters squared (kg/m
2).  For children ages two to 19, BMI values 
are  plotted  on  growth  charts  from  the  Centers  for  Disease  Control  (CDC)  to  determine  the 
corresponding BMI-for-age percentile.  Children at or above the 85
th percentile of the gender- and 
age-specific BMI distribution are coded as overweight, and children at or above the 95
th percentile of 
the BMI distribution are coded as obese.  Approximately 28 percent of children in our sample are 
overweight (30 percent for subsidized children versus 28 percent for unsubsidized children) in the 
fall of kindergarten, and 13 percent are obese (12 percent for subsidized children versus 13 percent 
for unsubsidized children).                 
  We begin the analysis by estimating a reduced form OLS model to capture the relationship 
between  child  care  subsidy  receipt  and  children’s  weight  outcomes  in  the  fall  and  spring  of 
kindergarten.  Formally, this model is specified as follows: 
(2)  Wi = ʱ0+ ʱ1si + Xiʱ2 + Niʱ3 + νs + εi,                 
where Wi is one of three weight outcomes for the i
th child, si is a binary indicator of child care 
subsidy  receipt,  and  X  is  a  vector  of  observable  family  background  characteristics  that  may  be 
correlated with children’s weight outcomes.
30  Also included in the model is a set of census tracts 
characteristics, N, to proxy the neighborhood environment in which families reside and a set of state 
fixed effects, νs, to capture state-level policy, economic, and demographic factors that are associated 
with subsidy utilization and child well-being.  The coefficient of interest in (2) is ʱ1, which provides 
an estimate of the average difference in BMI and overweight/obesity prevalence between subsidy 
recipients and non-recipients, conditional on the covariates in the model.       
  Given that si takes a value of one for all subsidy recipients (and zero for all non-recipients), 
                                                       
30  The  child  characteristics  include  gender,  age,  race,  premature  birth,  low  birth  weight,  disabled,  and  first  time  kindergartner.    Family 
characteristics are mother’s age, mother’s educational attainment, mother’s fair/poor health status, family type, number of children in the family, 
English as the primary spoken language in the family, and log of total family income.  Finally, census tract/school controls include log of median 
household income, log of population density, percent non-Hispanic white, percent foreign born, percent ages 65 and over, percent female, percent 
of children ages 0-2 and 3-5 living in female-headed households, percent of children in the school eligible for free/reduced price lunch, an 
indicator for whether a majority of children in the school are minorities, and an indicator for whether the school receives Title I funding.    26 
an assumption imposed by the empirical framework is that of homogenous policy treatments and 
treatment effects across space (e.g., states or counties), child care providers, and dosages of subsidy 
receipt.  This  is  clearly  a  strong  assumption.    States  and  localities  vary  substantially  in  the 
administration of their subsidy systems, including, most crucially, the  operation of eligibility and 
benefit reimbursement rules.  Furthermore, subsidy policy by design allows children to enroll in a 
variety of child care arrangements, some of which are included in the formal market while others 
operate outside states’ regulatory regimes.  Finally, child care subsidy spells are known to occur in 
relatively short spurts, and it is common for children to experience multiple spells within a brief time 
period (Ha, 2009).  These considerations suggest that it is prudent to interpret ʱ1 as averages of 
heterogeneous effects of subsidy receipt across children exposed to varying amounts of the policy 
treatment and who operate in different policy and child care environments.
31   
    As is well-known in the child care literature, the selection of families into subsidized child 
care raises concerns that subsidy participants and non-participants differ systematically in ways that 
researchers are not able to capture.  If these selection mechanisms are correlated with measures of 
child well-being, the coefficient on subsidy receipt will be biased.  For example, it is plausible that 
highly motivated mothers or those with strong work preferences are more likely to request child care 
assistance.  Failure to control for maternal motivation and other relevant characteristics would lead to 
an upward  bias in the impact of subsidy receipt if these characteristics  positively influence child 
outcomes.  It is also possible tha t subsidy administrators systematically ration child care benefits 
according to specific household characteristics.  For example,  there are reasons to believe that 
caseworkers target both the lowest- and highest-skilled mothers in order to meet work participation 
                                                       
31 Of course, we would like to utilize data on the hours per day each child receives subsidized care as well as the length of time each child has 
received a subsidy.  However, such data are not available in the ECLS-K.  We could, in principle, allow the effect of subsidies to vary across the 
child care arrangements (which are collected by the ECLS-K), but including these arrangement in the model would introduce another endogeneity 
problem.  As discussed in the text, we somewhat relax the assumption of homogeneous treatment effects by conducting the analysis on sub-
groups of children defined by maternal education level and SES.        27 
targets.    These  possibilities  suggest  that  subsidy  receipt  is  correlated  with  unobserved  program 
characteristics, which, if left unmeasured, would bias the coefficient on subsidy receipt. 
  To produce credible estimates of the impact of subsidy policy on children’s weight outcomes, 
we offer our measure of families’ approximate travel distance to the closest public human services 
agency as a potential instrumental variable.  Such an instrument must meet two conditions.  It should 
be correlated with the endogenous right-hand-side variable—in this case, subsidy receipt—and it 
should be uncorrelated with the outcome of interest—in this case, measures of children’s weight—
expect through its relationship with subsidy receipt.  The previous sections provide intuitive and 
empirical evidence that families’ travel distance is in fact correlated with subsidy utilization in a 
sample  of  potentially  eligible  families.    Results  in  Herbst  and  Tekin  (2010b)  show  that  this 
relationship is even stronger for children of unmarried mothers.  Regarding the second criterion, 
Herbst and Tekin (2010b) provide detailed arguments for why families’ travel distance can be validly 
excluded from models of child outcomes.  To conserve space, we provide only a brief summary of 
those arguments here. 
  There are several threats to the validity of the distance instrument.  First, it was mentioned 
earlier that the travel distance could be determined by the joint location preferences of families and 
agencies.  If these unobserved family and agency preferences influence travel distance in ways that 
influence children’s weight outcomes, the coefficient on subsidy receipt will be biased.  As discussed 
in this paper and elsewhere (Herbst & Tekin, 2010b), the CCDF’s structure as a close-ended block 
grant coupled with its low take-up rate make it highly unlikely that parents would chose to live near 
an agency that determines subsidy eligibility and benefit levels.  As pointed out in Allard (2009), 
local governments are constrained in a variety of ways that make it difficult for agencies to adjust to 
short-run changes in the residential patterns of low-income families.  Second, the distance measure 
may proxy the extent of isolation from the social safety net, including access to such means-tested 
programs as SNAP and WIC, both of which may influence children’s weight outcomes.  Failing to   28 
account for these factors would invalidate our instrumental variables strategy.
32  Finally, it is possible 
that  families’  travel  distance  is  a  proxy  for  unobserved  family  and  neighborhood  attributes  that 
influence child well-being.  For example, mothers who face a short travel distance to the nearest 
agency may do so because they live in heavily populated (urban) and low-income neighborhoods.  
Conversely, it is possible that those with longer distances are located in rural areas with racially 
homogenous populations and constrained access to employment opportunities.
33  To the extent that 
the neighborhood environment directly affects child well-being or is correlated with resident family 
characteristics, we might be worried that variation in the  travel distance is systematically related to 
variation in children’s weight outcomes.  If these environmental factors are correlated with the travel 
distance and are not properly accounted for in the weight model, the distance measure would not 
constitute a valid instrument.   
  Table 4 explores the extent to which child and  maternal characteristics are random with 
respect to the travel distance before and after accounting for the neighborhood environment (Herbst 
& Tekin, 2010b).
34  In particular, column (1)  shows the F-statistic (and p-value) from a test of the 
null hypothesis of the  equality of child and  maternal  characteristics  across  the  quartiles of the 
distance distribution prior to conditioning on the neighborhood environment .  It is clear  from the 
reported F-statistics that many of these family characteristics are correlated with the travel distance.  
For example, we find that families residing close to a public human services agency are less likely to 
be white, more likely to have low levels of education, and have lower incomes than those residing far 
away from an agency.  Such differences justify our concern that the distance measure is a potential 
proxy  for  family  and  neighborhood  attributes  that  may  be  correlated  with  children’s  weight 
                                                       
32 We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this possibility to our attention. 
33 For the purposes of a study on childhood obesity, a critical neighborhood characteristic is the extent to which individuals have limited access to 
healthy food options.  Such ―food deserts‖ are particularly likely to be found in low-income areas, where the single mothers in this study are 
disproportionately located.  See Sparks et al. (2011) for a detailed review of research on the spatial distribution of food deserts across high- and 
low-income areas.  
34 These controls are: log of median household income, log of population density, percent non-Hispanic white, percent foreign born, percent ages 
65 and over, percent female, percent of children ages 0 -2 and 3-5 living in female-headed households (all at the census tract-level), percent of 
children in the school eligible for free/reduced price lunch, an indicator for whether a majority of children in the school a re minorities, and an 
indicator for whether the school receives Title I funding (all at the school-level).   29 
outcomes.  However, the story changes dramatically in columns (2) through (5), which present the 
child  and  maternal  characteristics  after  conditioning  on  the  (demeaned)  neighborhood  controls.  
These family characteristics are now randomized over the distance distribution, and even critical 
background characteristics like socio-economic status, maternal education, and family income are 
uncorrelated with travel distance after accounting for the family’s neighborhood context.  Indeed, the 
adjusted F-statistic (and p-value) in column (6) reveals that, with the exception of children’s race, 
there are no statistically significant differences in background characteristics across the distribution 
of the travel distance.  Such results indicate that neighborhood environment is responsible for the 
observed family-level differences across the distance distribution, and as long as these controls are 
included in the model, the distance measure can serve as a potentially valid instrument.     
Nevertheless, we take a number of steps to mitigate the potential threats to the validity of the 
distance instrument.  First, we control extensively for the neighborhood environment in which ECLS-
K families live.  Specifically, we include 11 census tract- and school-level variables in the weight 
model.    These  variables  capture  several  dimensions  of  neighborhoods’  wealth  and  resources, 
urbanicity, racial and ethnic composition, and family structure that are either potentially correlated 
with families’ location preferences or directly related to child well-being.  Second, we incorporate a 
comparable set of five controls for the neighborhood environment in which agencies are located.  
These controls account for the unobserved determinants of agency location decisions that may also 
be correlated with the distance families must travel to apply for public benefits.  Third, we include a 
vector  of  state  fixed  effects  to  account  for  state-level  policy,  economic,  and  demographic 
unobservables that may influence child well-being or are related to the spatial configuration of public 
human services agencies.  Finally, in robustness checks, we attempt to further account endogenous 
location choices by adding controls for whether the family chose its residential location based on the 
characteristics of local schools and whether a family moved since the birth of the focal child.  
  As mentioned above, the jurisdictions that govern child care subsidies differ in a variety of   30 
ways.    For  example,  some  of  these jurisdictions  are  urban  while  others are  rural.  There  is also 
substantial  variation  in  the  networks  of  local  roads  and  highways  and  the  systems  of  public 
transportation across these jurisdictions.   The results in Table 2 confirm that access to subsidies 
varies by urbanicity and local access to transportation.  Such insights suggest that constraining the 
relationship  between  travel  distance  and  subsidy  receipt  to  be  the  same  for  mothers  across  all 
jurisdictions might mask many of these jurisdiction-level differences that are likely to interact with 
the distance to influence subsidy utilization.  To address this issue, we allow the subsidy impact to 
differ by county of residence, which typically constitutes a jurisdiction.  Therefore, our identification 
strategy exploits this county-level variation in travel distance by interacting families’ travel distance 
with a set of county-of-residence indicators.
 35 With a p-value substantially less than 0.01, the set of 
distance-county interactions is highly statistically significant in the first-stage equation. 
Results 
  Table 5 presents the main results from our analysis of the impact of child care subsidies on 
children’s weight outcomes.  The top panel presents estimates using the fall of kindergarten weight 
outcomes, and the bottom panel explores these outcomes in the spring of kindergarten.  We begin by 
estimating a simple OLS regression of each weight outcome on the binary indicator of child care 
subsidy receipt [column (3)], followed by an OLS model that includes the full set of child and family 
variables, neighborhood and school controls, and state fixed effects [column (4)].  Finally, we present 
the  instrumental  variables  estimates  derived  from  two-stage  least  squares  (2SLS).    To  conserve 
space, we show only the coefficient on subsidy receipt, along with its standard error (in parentheses), 
which is adjusted for county-level clustering.           
  Looking first at the fall of kindergarten results, we find that the OLS coefficient on subsidy 
                                                       
35 To investigate this issue, Herbst and Tekin (2010a) produce county- and state-specific correlations between the distance measure and subsidy 
receipt. As expected, both sets of correlations are negative on average, but the amount of variation is substantially greater among counties, as 
evidenced by a comparison of the standard deviations: 0.305 for the county-specific correlations and 0.172 for the state-specific correlations. 
Additional evidence of between-county variation in the distance-subsidy relationship is provided by comparing correlations across urban and 
rural counties. Not surprisingly, the average correlation in rural counties is nearly three times larger than that in urban counties, but the spread of 
correlations around the mean is also greater (SD rural: 0.397 versus SD urban: 0.277). 
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receipt is positive in the BMI and overweight models and negative in the obesity models, although in 
no instance is estimate statistically significant.  Furthermore, in most cases the magnitude of the 
coefficient implies a subsidy effect that is close to zero.  Our instrumental variables estimates, on the 
other hand, imply sizeable and statistically significant impacts of subsidized child care.  For example, 
our results indicate that children receiving a child care subsidy in the year before kindergarten enter 
school with a BMI that is 3.5 percent higher than that for non-recipients.  In addition, subsidized 
children are 11.9 percentage points more likely to be overweight and 4.8 percentage points more 
likely to be obese.  The same pattern emerges for the spring of kindergarten weight outcomes, with 
subsidized children obtaining BMIs that 3.8 percent higher and rates of overweight and obesity that 
are, respectively, 14.5 percentage points and five percentage points higher than their unsubsidized 
counterparts. 
We  subject these results to a number of specification checks to ensure robustness.  The 
plausibility  of  the  2SLS  estimates  hinges  on  the  validity  of  the  key  identifying  assumption: 
conditional on the observable family and neighborhood controls and state fixed effects, the distance 
instruments can be excluded from the weight models.  This assumption would be violated if there are 
unobserved family and agency location choices that jointly determine the distance instrument and are 
correlated with children’s weight.  The IV results presented in Table 5 already condition on the 
neighborhood environment in which ECLS-K families live.  We take this analysis a step further by 
also controlling for the characteristics of neighborhoods in which agencies are located.  In doing so, 
we are able to purge the effects of confounding location preferences on both sides of the child care 
subsidy market.  Results from this exercise, which are shown in column (1) of Table 6, show that the 
subsidy estimates are robust to the inclusion of agencies’ neighborhood characteristics.  
To further guard against the confounding effects of endogenous residential location choices, 
we utilize an item in the ECLS-K that asks whether a given family chose its current home location 
based on the attributes of local schools.  Assuming that the demand for certain school characteristics   32 
is highly correlated with parental preferences regarding other public services, including this variable 
in the model should further purge  the 2SLS estimates of bias resulting from unobserved  family 
location  choices.    As  shown  in  column  (2)  of  Table  6,  our  subsidy  estimates  are  robust  to  the 
inclusion of this preference variable.  Next, we add a control for whether the family moved since the 
focal child’s birth.  Generally speaking, this variable should account for the opportunity to choose a 
home location based on the accessibility social services among families that have higher propensities 
to move.  As shown in column (3), our subsidy estimates are once again robust to the inclusion of 
this variable.
36                               
Next, we conduct a falsification test to provide one more piece of evidence in support of the 
validity of the distance instrument.  If our identifying assumption is valid, then a variable predicting 
child care subsidy receipt should not affect children in families that are highly unlikely to be eligible 
for assistance.  Since all families in the ECLS-K have children, we focus the falsification test on two-
parent families in the top two quintiles of the SES distribution.  We first estimate the first-stage 
subsidy receipt equation on the sample of single mothers in order to calculate a predicted probability 
of subsidy receipt for the subset of two-parent families in the top SES quintiles.  We then include this 
variable in the child production function.  The falsification test provides no evidence against the 
validity of our identification strategy: in no case do we find that predicted subsidy receipt influences 
the well-being of children in high SES two-parent families.     
In final set of analyses, we explore the possibility of heterogeneous subsidy impacts across 
sub-groups  of  children  and  mothers.    Generally  speaking,  the  estimates  are  substantially  larger 
among  boys  and  among  children  living  with  a  low-skilled  mother.    We  do  not  find  much 
heterogeneity  across  children  of  different  races  and  ethnicities.    Subsidized  boys  experience  an 
increase in BMI of 6.8 percent and a rise in obesity rates of 9.1 percentage points, whereas the 
                                                       
36 We also estimate the model limiting the sample to those who did not move since the birth of the focal child.  The coefficients on subsidy receipt 
are similar in sign and magnitude to the main results, although they are less precisely estimated due to a dramatic drop in the sample size.   33 
relevant estimates for girls are 0.6 percent and 0.8 percentage points, respectively.  The differences 
across maternal education are striking.  Among children with low-skilled mothers (defined as those 
with a high school degree or less), subsidy receipt is expected to increase BMI by 4.6 percent and the 
likelihood of obesity by 11.5 percentage points.  Conversely, our estimates imply that subsidy receipt 
lowers  BMI  and  decreases  the  probability  of  obesity  among  children  with  high-skilled  mothers 
(defined as those with some college or above).  Indeed, these subsidized children have BMIs and 
obesity  rates  that  are,  respectively,  2.7  percent  and  10.8  percentage  points  lower  than  their 
unsubsidized counterparts.    
These  divergent  estimates  by  maternal  education suggest  that  the  employment effects  of 
subsidy receipt may be more economically rewarding for high-skilled parents.  The greater returns to 
work for such parents could be used to make further health investments in children that ultimately 
reduce the likelihood of obesity.  It is also possible that increases in education lead to stable and 
flexible jobs, which in turn might allow mothers to allocate more time to the production of health for 
their children.  Furthermore,  high-skilled mothers  could be more likely to find jobs with health 
insurance, which may also reduce the likelihood of obesity among their children.  In any case, these 
differing results indicate that the subsidy effect is not homogenous over the distribution of maternal 
education. Given that most states currently ration child care assistance, such heterogeneity suggests 
that giving priority to high-skilled mothers has the twin advantages of not only assisting states in 
meeting the stringent employment targets set forth by welfare reform, but it may also reduce the 
prevalence of obesity within this sub-set of children. 
VII. Conclusion 
In a review of the literature regarding the take-up of social programs, Currie (2004) notes that 
after many years of research, we still know relatively little about the factors that matter most to 
program participation in addition to the policy mechanisms that are likely to mitigate the costs of 
participation.  This is especially true for CCDF child care subsidies, a program with utilization rates   34 
below many other means-tested programs. Given the importance of child care subsidies in efforts to 
move low-income individuals from dependence on government assistance toward economic self-
sufficiency, there is a growing need to better understand the factors underlying subsidy take-up.   
In  this  paper,  we  examine  the  role  of  the  spatial  accessibility  of  public  human  services 
agencies  in  influencing  child  care  subsidy  receipt.  In  particular,  we  calculate  the  approximate 
distance that low-income families must travel from home in order to reach the nearest agency that 
administers the subsidy application process.  Using data from the ECLS-K, our results indicate that 
the probability of child care subsidy utilization declines as the distance to public human services 
agencies  increases.    Specifically,  we  find  a  one  percent  increase  in  the  distance  to  the  closest 
administrative  office  reduces  subsidy  participation  rates  by  roughly  one  percentage  point.    Our 
simulations  results  indicate  that  increasing  accessibility  to  agencies  by  reducing  parents’  travel 
distance would result in a non-trivial rise in the subsidy utilization rate.  Furthermore, the gains in 
subsidy utilization would be greater if such efforts to  increase the spatial accessibility of human 
services agencies are concentrated in rural areas, where  the travel costs  associated with subsidy 
participation are comparatively large. In addition to reducing parents’ travel distance, our results 
suggest that allowing parents to have access to multiple agencies in the county of residence is another 
fruitful method for increasing the subsidy utilization rate.   
The distance measure developed in this paper presents researchers with a unique opportunity 
to study the impact of subsidies on outcomes related to children and parents.  A sizeable body of 
work already explores some of these outcomes (e.g., Blau & Tekin, 2007; Tekin, 2005, 2007; Herbst 
2010; Herbst & Tekin, 2011a, 2010a; Meyers, Heintze, & Wolf, 2002).  However, researchers have 
struggled to develop convincing empirical strategies to surmount the endogeneity of subsidy receipt.  
In fact, identification problems are commonly cited as being primarily responsible for the diversity of 
empirical estimates documented throughout the child care literature (e.g., Anderson & Levine, 2000; 
Bernal & Keane, 2010).  Parental travel distance to public human services agencies represents a   35 
heretofore untapped source of plausibly exogenous variation that researchers can use to identify the 
causal effect of child care subsidies on a number of policy-relevant outcomes, including maternal 
employment  and  human  capital  accumulation  and  children’s  cognitive,  behavioral,  and  health 
outcomes.                      
  To demonstrate the usefulness of this distance measure, we employ it in an analysis of the 
impact of child care subsidy receipt on childhood obesity.  Our instrumental variables results indicate 
that subsidy receipt  prior to kindergarten entry  increase BMI and lead to higher probabilities of 
becoming obese and overweight throughout kindergarten.  These results stand in contrast to those 
obtained from OLS, which point to small and statistically insignificant associations between subsidy 
receipt  and  children’s  weight  outcomes.    Results  from  the  sub-group  analyses  suggest  that  the 
detrimental  effect  of  child  care  subsidy  receipt  is  concentrated  among  children  of  low-skilled 
mothers, whereas subsidy receipt actually lowers the likelihood of becoming obese and overweight 
among the children of high-skilled mothers.     36 
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Table 1: Estimates of the Relationship between Distance to Public Human Services Agencies and Child Care Subsidy Receipt 
  (1)  (2)   (3)   (4) 
Linear Specification         
ln(distance to public human services agency)       -0.014*** 
(0.003) 
     -0.013*** 
(0.003) 
    -0.010*** 
(0.003) 
  -0.009** 
(0.004) 
Non-Linear Specification         
Second Quartile of the Distance Distribution           -0.010 
(0.008) 
         -0.010 
(0.008) 
        -0.008 
(0.008) 
        -0.009 
(0.008) 
Third Quartile of the Distance Distribution       -0.026*** 
(0.008) 
    -0.025*** 
(0.008) 
  -0.019** 
(0.008) 
  -0.022** 
(0.009) 
Fourth Quartile of the Distance Distribution      -0.039*** 
(0.008) 
    -0.035*** 
(0.008) 
    -0.027*** 
(0.008) 
    -0.026*** 
(0.010) 
Child Characteristics  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Maternal and Family Characteristics  No  No  Yes  Yes 
County Fixed Effects  No  No  No  Yes 
Number of Observations  9,231  9,231  9,231  9,231 
Notes: Standard errors, displayed in parentheses, are adjusted for clustering at the census tract level.  Distances are measured in miles.  The linear specification takes the natural 
logarithm of the distance to the nearest agency within a given county.  The non-linear specification is expressed as a set of dummy variables denoting the quartiles of the 
distance distribution.  Column (2) adds controls for gender, child’s age (in months), child’s age squared, race/ethnicity (four dummy variables), child’s weight, premature birth 
(one dummy variable), low birth weight (one dummy variable), disabled (one dummy variable), and first-time kindergartner (one dummy variable).  Column (3) adds controls 
for mother’s age, family structure (three dummy variables), mother’s educational attainment (three dummy variables), number of other children in the family (two dummy 
variables), English as the primary spoken language in the household (one dummy variable), and the log of total household income.  Column (4) adds county fixed effects.  *, **, 











Table 2: Tests of Robustness and Sub-Group Analyses 




Robustness Check: Additional Controls for Endogenous Location Choices 
     Add family census tract controls    -0.009** 
(0.004) 
9,231 
     Add agency census tract controls 
 
    -0.018*** 
(0.006) 
9,231 
     School fixed effects      -0.016*** 
(0.006) 
9,231 
     Control for movers and families choosing home location because        
of school characteristics 
 
  -0.008** 
(0.004) 
9,231 
     
Robustness Check: Measurement Error in the Travel Distance     
     Control for census tract land area and land area squared    -0.009** 
(0.004) 
9,231 











Robustness Check: An Alternative Distance Measure 




Sub-Group Analyses     
     Urban residence  
 










     Request or complete applications via mail/telephone/online 
 
     Cannot request or complete applications via mail/telephone/online    
   -0.010** 
(0.005) 






     Families located in high car ownership neighborhoods 
 
     Families located in low car ownership neighborhoods 









     Families receiving AFDC/TANF or food stamps 
 
     Families not receiving AFDC/TANF or food stamps 
0.003 
(0.009) 






Notes: Standard errors, displayed in parentheses, are adjusted for clustering at the census tract level.  Unless noted otherwise, all specifications 
take the natural logarithm of the minimum distance to the nearest agency within a given county.  The instrumental variable models include the 
neighborhood controls listed above as well as state fixed effects.  The models run separately on the application policies do not include county 
fixed effects, but include a control for urban residence.  Neighborhoods coded as having high car ownership rates are those in which the 
fraction of households owning zero cars is at or below the 25
th percentile of the distribution or those in which the fraction of households owning 
two+ cars is at or above 75
th percentile of the distribution.  *, **, *** indicate that a given distance coefficient is statistically significant at the 





Table 3: The Simulated Effect of Changes in the Distance to Public Human Services Agencies 
Scenario  Pr(subsidy utilization)  Percent Change 
All Children in the Bottom Three SES Quintiles 
     Baseline (mean distance to nearest agency: 7.73 miles)  0.070   
     20
th percentile of distance distribution (1.91 miles)       0.078  11.4% 
     10
th percentile of distance distribution (1.24 miles)       0.082  17.1% 
     5
th percentile of distance distribution (0.88 miles)    
    
0.085  21.4% 
Children Living in Urban Areas     
     Baseline   0.070   
     20
th percentile of distance distribution   0.075  7.1% 
     10
th percentile of distance distribution   0.078  11.4% 
     5
th percentile of distance distribution   
    
0.080  14.3% 
Children Living in Non-Urban Areas     
     Baseline   0.070   
     20
th percentile of distance distribution   0.103  47.1% 
     10
th percentile of distance distribution   0.114  62.9% 
     5
th percentile of distance distribution    0.123  75.7% 
Notes: The first set of simulations is based on the coefficients from the linear specification in Table 2, column (4).  The second and third sets of 
simulations are based on the separate urban and non-urban regression results from Table 3.  For each set of simulations, we calculate the 
predicted probability of subsidy utilization if all families face distances at the 20
th, 10
th, and 5
th percentiles of the full sample distance distribution, 


































Table 4: Selected Child and Family Characteristics by Distance Quartile 
























Distance to  agency (miles) 
 
  1.55  3.75  7.23  19.91   
Child is male (%)  0.84 
(0.471) 
0.491  0.503  0.499  0.480  0.33 
(0.806) 
Child is white (%)  43.36 
(0.000) 
0.485  0.498  0.521  0.528  2.24 
(0.081) 
Premature birth (%)  0.29 
(0.835) 
0.176  0.177  0.169  0.177  0.09 
(0.964) 
Low birth weight (%)  0.48 
(0.699) 
0.056  0.061  0.070  0.059  0.46 
(0.711) 
Child is disabled (%)  0.20 
(0.898) 
0.168  0.158  0.157  0.145  0.54 
(0.652) 
Maternal age (years, fall of k)  4.35 
(0.004) 
30.65  31.03  30.92  31.32  1.50 
(0.213) 
Maternal education is < high school (%)  11.58 
(0.000) 
0.176  0.144  0.166  0.140  1.75 
(0.154) 
Maternal health is fair/poor (%)  2.70 
(0.044) 
0.092  0.108  0.086  0.097  0.77 
(0.508) 
Total family income ($, fall of k)  14.94 
(0.000) 
31,170  33,354  34,699  32,020  1.95 
(0.119) 
SES in bottom quintile (%)  14.17 
(0.000) 
0.272  0.239  0.250  0.243  1.12 
(0.341) 
WIC participant (%)  15.46 
(0.000) 
0.679  0.640  0.653  0.644  1.83 
(0.138) 
Notes: Analyses are conducted on children and mothers with non-missing data.  The first F-statistic (and p-value) shown is from a test of the equivalence of child/family 
characteristics without the neighborhood controls.  The means are derived from an OLS regression of each child/family characteristic on four distance quartile dummy 
variables (with the constant omitted) and a vector of (demeaned) neighborhood controls.  These controls are: log of median household income, log of population density, 
percent non-Hispanic white, percent foreign born, percent ages 65 and over, percent female, percent of children ages 0-2 and 3-5 living in female-headed households (all at 
the census tract-level), percent of children in the school eligible for free/reduced price lunch, an indicator for whether a majority of children in the school are minorities, and 
an indicator for whether the school receives Title I funding.  The second F-statistic (and p-value) shown is from a test of the equivalence of child/family characteristics with 





Table 5: Ordinary Least Squares and Instrumental Variables Estimates of the  
Impact of Child Care Subsidy Receipt on Children’s Weight Outcomes,  



















Fall of Kindergarten 





































0.126        -0.004 
(0.016) 




Spring of Kindergarten 
     BMI 
 
 






     ln(BMI) 
 
 




  0.039* 
(0.023) 
     Overweight 
 
 







     Obese 
 






Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering at the county-level.  The baseline OLS model is a regression of each 
weight outcome on the indicator of child care subsidy receipt.  The full models (OLS and 2SLS) include controls for child/family 
characteristics, neighborhood characteristics, and state fixed effects.  Child characteristics: gender, age, race, premature birth, low birth 
weight, disabled, and first time kindergartner.  Family characteristics: mother’s age, mother’s educational attainment, mother’s fair/poor 
health status, family type, number of children in the family, English as the primary spoken language in the family, and log of total 
family income.  Census tract/school controls: log of median household income, log of population density, percent non-Hispanic white, 
percent foreign born, percent ages 65 and over, percent female, percent of children ages 0-2 and 3-5 living in female-headed households, 
percent of children in the school eligible for free/reduced price lunch, an indicator for whether a majority of children in the school are 
minorities, and an indicator for whether the school receives Title I funding, and state fixed effects.  All models include dummy variables 
that equal unity for child and family controls with missing data.  *, **, *** indicate that the coefficient on subsidy receipt is statistically 
significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.     
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Table 6: Robustness Checks on the Instrumental Variables Estimates 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
 
Outcome 
+ Local Agency 
Controls  
+ Control for 
Family Location 
Decisions 
+ Control for 
Movers 
Fall of Kindergarten       
     BMI 
 
 
  0.628* 
(0.377) 
  0.643* 
(0.363) 
  0.688* 
(0.362) 
     ln(BMI) 
 
 
  0.035* 
(0.020) 
  0.035* 
(0.019) 
  0.037* 
(0.019) 
     Overweight 
 
  
  0.124* 
(0.073) 












Spring of Kindergarten        







  0.732* 
(0.412) 







  0.042* 
(0.022) 
     Overweight 
 
  
  0.144* 
(0.082) 
  0.142* 
(0.075) 
    0.152** 
(0.075) 








Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering at the county-level.  Column (1) includes 
controls for the log of median household income, log of population density, percent non-Hispanic white, percent 
foreign born, and percent of employed females ages 16 and over. Column (2) adds a dummy variable to indicate 
families that choose the current home location because of school characteristics.  Column (3) adds a dummy 
variable to indicate families that moved since the focal child’s birth.  See Table 5 for a list of the other controls 
included in the model.  *, **, *** indicate that the coefficient on subsidy receipt is statistically significant at the 
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.   46 
 
Appendix A: Construction of the Database on U.S. Public Human Services Agencies  
 
The process for creating the distance measure began by collecting data on the precise location of 
every public human services agency in the U.S.  In most cases, address data were available on the website 
of  the  state  agency  responsible  for  administering  the  child  care  subsidy  system.    For  example,  the 
Department of Economic Security administers the subsidy program in Arizona, and the office locations 
can be found here: https://www.azdes.gov/main.aspx?menu=128&id=2724.  In Maryland, the subsidy 
program is managed by the Office of Child Care in the Department of Education, and information on 
agency locations can be found here: http://www.dhr.state.md.us/county.php.  For some states, we were 
not able to readily find the office locations on states’ websites, so we relied on administrator contact lists 
provided  by  the  National  Child  Care  Information  Center  (NCCIC: 
http://nccic.acf.hhs.gov/statedata/dirs/display.cfm?title=ccdf#az)  and  the  Child  Care  and  Development 
Fund Report of State Plans (various years) for this information.  We were careful to ensure that each 
agency is involved in eligibility and benefit determination for child care subsidies.    
For each agency, we collected information on the state name, state FIPS code, county name and 
county FIPS code in which each office is located; the address (including building or suite number), city, 
and  zip code; telephone  and  fax  numbers;  and  the name  of  the  agency  that administers  the  subsidy 
program.  Most states organize human service provision at the county-level, with one agency located in 
each county. However, in some urban counties and many cities, there are multiple agencies located in the 
jurisdiction.  For example, La Paz county, located in Western Arizona, is a rural jurisdiction, and its 
residents have access to a single agency.  Maricopa county, in contrast, is an urban area (containing the 
city of Phoenix), and its residents have access to eight offices.  As for Maryland, every county contains 
one human services agency, except for Baltimore City, which has nine offices.  In a small number of 
cases, a locale does not include an agency, so that its residents must travel to adjacent counties to apply 
for child care assistance.  For example, Pend Orielle county in Washington State does not have a human 
services agency.  Therefore, as stipulated by the Department of Social and Health Services, residents in 
this county must travel to a branch office in Spokane county (located south of Pend Orielle) to apply for 
assistance.  Generally speaking, these agencies serve residents from multiple counties.      
Our database attempts to account for these complications.   Agencies located in multiple-agency-
jurisdictions are each treated as separate entries in the database.  Agencies that serve residents from 
multiple jurisdictions (because their county-of-residence does not have one) are repeated in the database, 
with  each  entry  denoting  the  relevant  county  served  by  the  office.    In  all,  we  collected  data  on 
approximately 3,600 unique public human services agencies.  
One concern is that our agency database captures the current address of each agency, while our 
child care subsidy data come from surveys the conducted in the late-1990s and early-2000s. To the extent 
that  some  of  these  agencies  moved  to  their  current  address  after  these  years,  our  distance  measure 
contains measurement error. However, as previously stated, we recorded the telephone number of each 
agency in the database, and we asked two research assistants to make phone calls to more than 10 percent 
of  (randomly  chosen)  offices  to  inquire  about  their  location  history  since  1998.  Fortunately,  an 
overwhelming majority of these agencies have been at the same location during this period, and we were 
able to identify the previous address in most cases for the small number of movers.  Of the 405 phone 
calls made to agencies, we were able to speak to a representative in 228 cases.  Of these cases, only 35 
reported that they had moved at some point since 1997.  The rest stated that they were either in the same 
location for sure or that they had ―probably‖ been in the same location. 47 
 
The next step in the process involved geocoding the location of public human services offices by 
assigning  a  latitude  and  longitude  coordinate  to  each.  We  worked  in  collaboration  with  Geocoder 
(www.geocoder.us) to generate the coordinates.  Geocoder was able to provide these coordinates using its 
own application programming interface (API) as well as that from Google, now considered the gold 
standard for producing geocodes.  Based on our discussions with Geocoder analysts, we concluded that 
the Google-based geocodes were of higher-quality, so we use these as the basis for making the distance 
calculations.    Of  the  3,659  agencies  (unique  or  repeated)  in  our  database,  2,887  (approximately  80 
percent) were able to be geocoded to its exact location (i.e., typically to 30 feet or less).  Another 543 
agencies (15 percent) were goecoded to roughly block- or street-level accuracy.  For 229 agencies (six 
percent), only the city or zip code was available to be geocoded, decreasing locational precision to as 
many  as  a  few  miles.    In  sum,  approximately  95  percent  of  public  human  services  agencies  were 
geocoded with a level of precision at the block-level or better.   
A potential concern with the geocoding process is that the agency addresses would not match 
those found in Geocoder’s database.  For example, slight errors in spelling or formatting in a set of 
agency  addresses  could  cause  a  different  set  of  addresses  to  be  geocoded.    Fortunately,  Geocoder 
provided us with a measure called the Levenshtein-Damerau, which calculates the ―edit distance‖ (or 
level  of  textual  discrepancy)  between  the  addresses  provided  and  the  addresses  actually  assigned 
geocodes.  We used this measure to double-check the accuracy of agency addresses that were assigned 
low scores, and we corrected any errors that were discovered.  Generally speaking, we found this measure 
to be quite sensitive to small inconsistencies between the provided and geocoded addresses.  Therefore, 
our data checks were extensive.       
In  the  final  step,  we  calculated  the  distance  between  the  location  of  public  human  services 
agencies and the residential location of each family in our analysis samples.  Given that we plan to use 
this distance measure with a number of datasets (e.g., Early Childhood Longitudinal Study—Kindergarten 
cohort and Fragile Families and Child Well-Being Study), we utilized the following approach.  Users of 
the ECLS-K and FFCW contract data are able to observe families’ residential locations at the census 
tract-level.  Since child care subsidies are distributed by agencies organized at the county-level, we use 
the county as the geographic boundary for calculating the distances.  As a result, we calculated the 
Euclidean (or as-the-crow-flies) distance (in miles) between the location of human services agencies and 
every census tract centroid in the county in which each agency resides.  For example, La Paz County in 
Arizona has one agency and six census tracts.  Therefore, our database contains six sets of distances 
associated with this agency: one for each census tract.  In Maryland, Montgomery County also has one 
social serve agency but 176 census tracts.  Our database contains the distance from this agency to each 
census tract in the county.  Jurisdictions with multiple agencies have a set of distance calculations for 
each agency.  For example, Baltimore City has nine agencies and nearly 200 census tracts, leading to 
approximately  1,800  separate  agency-tract  calculations.    In  addition  to  calculating  the  distance,  we 
produced the census tract identification number associated with each agency-tract combination.  We use 
the census tract code to merge the distance measure with families in our analysis samples.  Although this 
process was extremely time-intensive, the results provide us with the flexibility to append the distance 
measure to virtually any dataset with census tract codes. 